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Abstract: The net neutrality norm generates wealth transfers from one type of internet content 
provider to another.  In theory, these transfers might be socially desirable, and could be justified 
on the basis of informational externalities similar to those that have been identified to justify the 
fair use doctrine in copyright law.  However, in practice, the conditions that justify fair use in the 
copyright context do not appear to hold in the settings in which the net neutrality principle 
operates.  Moreover, the internal subsidization required by net neutrality generates a transfer 
from the relatively poor to the relatively rich. The potential welfare gains that might come from 
controlling anticompetitive abuse or government coercion through implementation of the policy 
can be achieved by alternative policies with less harmful consequences.  
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regulation, subsidy, fair use  
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Net neutrality is an appealing term.  After all, what might be the conceptual antithesis of net 
neutrality: net discrimination?  The word discrimination suggests an evil purpose, while 
neutrality suggests immediately an open, fair process.  The term alone conditions one to support 
the concept. 
Net neutrality consists, as far as I can tell, of a regulatory norm that is as simple as it is 
appealing.  Providers of content transported through the networks of broadband internet firms 
cannot be charged different prices by the broadband firms for the service of transporting their 
content.1  Thus, a firm that provides highly demanded content that absorbs much of the capacity 
of the broadband network cannot be charged for the additional congestion and wear-and-tear 
associated with the transporting of its content. 
If there were no differences between the consumers of various services – for example, if 
everyone consumed the same information services from the internet – net neutrality would truly 
be neutral in effect.  It would not permit differential pricing, or discrimination, to adversely 
affect any providers of content.  It would not differentially impact any consumer, since every 
consumer is identical by hypothesis.  
But consumers of internet services are not identical—they demand different services, which 
impose dissimilar costs on broadband firms.2  Consequently, net neutrality requires some 
consumers to subsidize the consumption of others.  In this sense, net neutrality is not neutral at 
all: it forces A to pay for the consumption of B.  Viewed from this perspective, net neutrality is a 
form of differential pricing. 
The basic economics of net neutrality seems similar to that of toll bridges.3  Charging all users of 
the bridge the same amount may force some users to subsidize others.  This has moral hazard and 
adverse selection implications.  Consumer welfare declines, unless there is an efficiency case for 
a regulation that requires internal subsidization of one group of consumers by another group of 
consumers (cross-subsidization).4  I will consider the possible welfare cases for such internal 
                                                 
1 As Becker, Carleton and Sider explain, the net neutrality principle has devolved into four specific requirements: 
broadband providers are “prohibited from: (1) prioritizing traffic and charging differential prices based on the 
priority status; (2) imposing congestion-related charges; (3) adopting business models that offer exclusive content or 
that establish exclusive relationships with particular content providers; and (4) charging content providers to access 
the Internet based on factors other than the bandwidth supplied.”  (Becker, Carlton, Sider, at 498) 
2 On the variation in network services and costs, see Yoo (2013). 
3 The similarity is that in both contexts, one observes large up front capital expenses to construct a facility, and the 
incremental cost of using the facility is comparatively small.  The economics of bridges is a topic with an extensive 
literature.  See, e.g., Hotelling (1938); Minasian (1979).  The difficult problem of optimal supply analyzed in the 
earlier literature has important implications for the treatment of different types of user, and the extent to which one 
can determine when the pricing of bridge services inefficiently advantages one user at the expense of another user.  I 
will oversimplify and avoid most of these difficulties here. 
4 I use the term cross-subsidy as an equivalent to “internal subsidy”, as in Posner (1971).  This is a popular, though 
admittedly non-rigorous use of the term.  In my treatment, a cross subsidy or internal subsidy results from a 
regulation (such as a net neutrality requirement) when a firm is forced to change its pricing structure, as a result of 
the regulation, in a manner that benefits one group of consumers and disadvantages another group of consumers.  
The concept of cross-subsidy is difficult and would require a much more extensive treatment than offered here to 
deal with adequately in economic terms.  A rigorous treatment of the concept of cross-subsidy is provided in 
Faulhaber (1975).  
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subsidization here, drawing on familiar analogies in the law.  After that, I will consider 
alternative arguments for the net neutrality norm based on distributional concerns, potential 
anticompetitive abuse, and government coercion.  
I conclude that the case for net neutrality is weak.  The potential efficiency justifications for the 
policy are speculative, and unsupported so far by the evidence.  The distributional consequences 
of the policy are undesirable.  The policy effects a transfer of resources from the less advantaged 
to the more advantaged without any significant offsetting welfare gain.  Every speculative gain 
that might come from the policy, such as controlling anticompetitive abuse or government 
coercion, can be achieved by an alternative policy with less harmful consequences.   
1. The Bridge Analogy 
Consider a toll bridge with two types of user: ordinary cars and heavy trucks.  The difference 
between the two is that the heavy trucks are more costly to the bridge owner to service because 
they impose more congestion on bridge traffic.  Congestion reduces the flow of traffic over the 
bridge, thereby increasing the average cost of the service.  In addition, the trucks impose more 
depreciation (wear and tear) on the bridge.  A profit-maximizing bridge owner would adopt a 
system of discriminatory Ramsey prices, charging a mark-up above user-specific marginal cost 
that is inversely related to the elasticity of user demand.5  Assuming the demand elasticity of cars 
is no greater than that of trucks – cars consisting of a larger percentage of leisure travelers are 
more likely to seek cheaper though more time-consuming routes – the owner would charge 
higher prices to trucks than to cars. 
A regulatory authority that seeks to maximize welfare subject to a given level of profit promised 
to the bridge owner would also choose a system of discriminatory Ramsey prices, though not 
precisely the same as those chosen by the unregulated monopolist.  The mark-up above user-
specific marginal cost would be somewhat less, but would still vary inversely with the elasticity 
of user demand.6 
Suppose, however, the regulator requires the bridge owner to charge the same price to both cars 
and trucks.  Under the conditions assumed, cars would, in effect, finance an internal subsidy for 
trucks.  As a result, trucks would tend to use the bridge more than if the cross-subsidy were not 
present, and cars would use the bridge less than if the cross-subsidy were not present.  The 
additional use by trucks would increase congestion costs, driving up the cost of the service and 
increasing depreciation costs. 
Charging cars and trucks different prices would permit the bridge owner to internalize to truck 
owners the additional costs imposed by the trucks.  This, in turn, would discourage the trucks 
from excessive use – for example, from imposing a marginal cost of $1 on the bridge owner and 
other users when the marginal benefit to the truck owner from the particular use is only $.50.  A 
charge that varied with the intensity of the use would encourage truck owners to consider the 
                                                 
5 Here I refer to the simplest form of Ramsey pricing that results from profit maximization by a multi-product 
monopolist.  For simplicity, I assume that the user demand functions are independent of each other.  For a 
straightforward presentation, see Tirole (1989). 
6 See generally Baumol and Bradford (1970). 
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congestion costs and the miles of wear and tear imposed in each relevant time period. The higher 
charge would also induce some truck owners to avoid the bridge in favor of another route.  Over 
time, charges might encourage technological innovation toward trucks that carry the same freight 
while imposing lower congestion and depreciation costs. 
Charging separate prices allows the bridge owner to reduce congestion and depreciation costs, 
and pass those cost savings on to consumers in the form of lower general prices (for an 
equivalent unit of service) for use of the bridge, which, in turn, would increase the total 
consumption of the services offered by the bridge. 
Admittedly, in some cases the bridge owner might choose not to charge differential prices.  
Perhaps the differences in service costs are minor, and the administrative costs of differential 
pricing exceed the efficiency gains.  Alternatively, perhaps trucks provide the greatest source of 
demand for new bridge capacity.  Foresighted bridge owners would therefore be reluctant to tax 
a major source of industrial capacity growth.  In these cases, the bridge owner may choose not to 
impose differential pricing even if completely free to do so. 
The bridge analogy seems to apply straightforwardly to the net neutrality problem.  Net 
neutrality is equivalent to prohibiting the bridge owner from using differential pricing, and 
generates similar costs.  Some providers of internet content, such as Netflix, impose 
extraordinary congestion costs as a result of the internal subsidy from consumers of other 
internet services.7  Hence, permitting the network owner to price differentially can and probably 
would enhance consumer welfare.8  To the extent that heavy use of the service has a depreciation 
effect (electrical components suffer wear and tear from use), similar costs are imposed.9 
2. Is There a Case for Cross-Subsidization? 
As a general matter, it is not difficult to justify cross-subsidization in the presence of significant 
externalities, but the question is whether such a justification is applicable in the net neutrality 
context. 
Return to the bridge story.  If trucks provide a positive externality to all bridge users, then cross-
subsidization might be socially optimal.  Suppose, for example, the trucks provide a good that 
benefits other bridge users (or the consumers of those other bridge users) through a mechanism 
that fails to charge a price for those external benefits.  Vaccines, for example, provide a 
beneficial externality to consumers who do not consume the vaccines.  A subsidy toward the 
trucks carrying those vaccines might be optimal.  If most of the trucks carry vaccines, a subsidy 
funded by cars and benefitting trucks in general might be optimal. 
Similarly, if the services that impose the greatest congestion costs on the internet also provide a 
positive externality to all consumers of internet services, then the cross-subsidies created by net 
                                                 
7 See Clark (2014). 
8 See, e.g., Becker, Carlton, and Sider (2010); Peitz, Martin and Schuett, Florian (2015).  In my example in the text, 
if the privately-chosen prices are relatively close to the socially optimal Ramsey prices, then unregulated monopoly 
would enhance welfare relative to the equal-pricing rule. 
9 Although the empirical importance of such depreciation may be entirely speculative, for a model that incorporates 
depreciation as a factor, see Odlyzko (1997). 
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neutrality might be socially optimal.  The informational services that are often cited for 
providing important positive externalities to society are educational.  Educational services 
enhance the stock of human capital, and thereby help to make members of society more 
productive, or otherwise advance science and culture.  Because of these benefits, the law has in 
some cases provided an implicit subsidy for informational services that are primarily 
educational. 
The fair use doctrine of copyright law, for example, imposes a subsidy funded by one type of 
information service for the benefit of another type of information service: from the holder of a 
copyright to an infringer of the copyright.  Under the fair use doctrine, an agent who copies 
copyrighted material is not infringing if the use is deemed fair.  Fair use is determined by several 
factors, such as the extent and purpose of the copying.  One key factor supporting a finding of 
fairness is copying for educational purposes.  Educational purposes can be understood broadly to 
include information that advances culture.  Satire, for example, arguably has an educational 
purpose, because it is through satire that the public becomes aware of the shortcomings or flaws 
of certain theories or works of art.  For example, Alice Randall’s The Wind Done Gone provides 
an account, deemed a parody by one court, of the fictional events from Margaret Mitchell’s Gone 
With the Wind, told from the eyes of slaves rather than from the eyes of slaveholders.  In a 
society matured to the stage that its prior belief that one particular race should be given the legal 
power to hold another race in slavery now seems comically unjust, Randall’s retelling, from an 
upside-down perspective, of a famous work of art embodying the now-discredited view of social 
order has significant educational value.  By subsidizing such iconoclastic works of literature, fair 
use doctrine probably enhances society’s welfare.10 
Cross-subsidization of the sort required under the net neutrality principle is therefore not foreign 
to the common law, which for the most part strongly protects property rights, nor necessarily 
harmful to social welfare.  The question is whether this fair-use based theory of cross-
subsidization helps justify arguments supporting net neutrality. 
If the providers of heavily demanded internet content were providing educational services, or 
informational services that generally enhance the stock of human capital, then the net neutrality 
norm might lead to a socially optimal regulatory regime.  However, as far as I am aware, this is 
not the case.  Netflix, for example, streams popular movies and television shows through the 
internet, using an extraordinary amount of pipe capacity as it does so.  Some of the shows are 
critically acclaimed, but I doubt that any of them could be accurately described as educational in 
any significant sense.  The most popular Netflix program, House of Cards, offers a realistically 
cynical view of the inner workings of American politics, but such depictions of the political 
system have been part of western literature for a long time and probably do little to significantly 
enhance the stock of human capital.  To be sure, Shakespeare also gave us realistically cynical 
portraits of the inner workings of politics, but the similarity between Shakespeare and House of 
Cards is probably equivalent to the similarity between a Rembrandt and a typical piece of 
                                                 
10 Gordon (1982). 
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critically-acclaimed modern art: one truly educates and significantly enhances culture while the 
other mainly reflects the current tastes of the median consumer. 
Economides and Tag (2012) offer the most prominent externality justification for network 
neutrality to date, though it is different from the fair-use based theory just described.  Instead of 
externalities across different types of consumer, the external effect may be network externalities 
between consumer and content provider.11  Network effects may work in both directions across 
the platform, with more consumers generating more content, and more content generating more 
consumers.  The broadband network provider may tend to overcharge the content provider 
relative to the social optimum.  If the network externality suggested by Economides and Tag is 
sufficiently strong, implementation of the network neutrality norm might result in an optimal 
outcome.   
Although the Economides and Tag result is rather weak – under special conditions net neutrality 
might be socially optimal – there are still reasons to question its applicability to the real world.  
The result requires strong assumptions, such as identical consumers and inelastic demand.  
However, much of the economic controversy surrounding network neutrality stems from the 
heterogeneity of consumers and the existence of some degree of demand elasticity for network 
services.  The bridge analogy with which this paper begins assumes these features.  Moreover, 
the empirical evidence regarding the importance of provider-to-consumer network effects is 
speculative at this stage,12 and the theory may not capture all of the relevant externalities 
(Becker, Carlton, Sider, 2010). 
3. Distributional Considerations 
On distributional grounds, cross-subsidizing informational services can harm social welfare, at 
least under a Rawlsian perspective,13 which disfavors wealth transfers from the materially 
advantaged to the relatively disadvantaged.  A Rawls-inspired welfare function would 
incorporate the distribution of resources as a component of social welfare.14  A more equal 
distribution of resources reduces the frequency of instances where individuals are born into, or 
somehow find themselves through no fault of their own, in impoverished households.  Thus, 
institutions that reduce the risk of being placed into such households enhance society’s welfare if 
members of society are sufficiently risk averse, and conversely institutions that increase this risk 
reduce society’s welfare.  This perspective suggests efficiency can be decomposed into general 
                                                 
11 Nicholas Economides and Joacim Tåg (2012). 
12 The provider-to-consumer network effect, which is important for Economides and Tag, can be examined in the 
context of newspapers to get a sense of its plausibility.  The argument is similar to saying that more newspapers 
leads to more newspaper readers.  While it is highly plausible that more readers will tend to generate more 
newspapers, it is not immediately plausible that more newspapers will generate more readers.  In addition, it is the 
content provided by the newspapers that might plausibly generate more readers, not the number of newspapers.  
Thus, an enhancement of quality (content) coupled with a reduction in quantity might have a stronger feedback 
effect on the number of consumers than a simple increase in quantity. 
13 Rawls (1971). 
14 See, e.g., Posner (1981, at 59).  Of course, one could say that this is just an ordinary social welfare function that 
takes risk-aversion into account.  See id. 
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efficiency (or “wealth maximization”) and distributional efficiency concerns.  I will focus on the 
distributional efficiency concern here. 
On the distributional effects of imposing cross-subsidies in information services, consider the 
British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC).  Because of the greater educational value of its 
programming, the BBC generally has a stronger claim to subsidies than does Netflix, yet the 
BBC subsidy is regressive in distributional terms.  It reduces the price of a service consumed 
mainly by the wealthy and compels the poor, through its government funding, to pay part of the 
cost of providing those services to the rich. 
Similarly, to the extent net neutrality results in subsidizing Netflix, it imposes a regressive tax on 
society.  The Netflix programs are less high-brow than those of the BBC, and as a result have a 
greater appeal to the average middle-income consumer, but the poorest of the poor are unlikely 
to be among the heavy consumers of Netflix.  A recent study of the demographics of Netflix 
users notes that “when compared to the average U.S. adult, recent Netflix subscribers are: (a) 
Gender: Fairly even gender split, 49% male, 51% female; (b) Age: 37% are Millennials (18-34), 
which is 23% more likely than average; (c) Residential status: slightly more likely to be adults 
who still live with their parents, although the majority (61%) of recent subscribers are 
homeowners; (d) Suburban living: 50% live in the suburbs, which is slightly more than average 
(+9%); (e) Household income (HHI): 42% have a HHI of $50K and under, 35% have a HHI of 
$50K-$100K, and 23% have a HHI over $100K; (f) Education: They are slightly more likely 
than average (+11%) to say their highest level of education is an associate or bachelor’s degree; 
(g) Parental status: 24% more likely to be parents and 52% more likely to have school-aged 
children living with them; (h) Household: 38% more likely to have 4 or more people living in 
their current household.”15  These factors suggest that the average Netflix consumers is wealthier 
than the average U.S. citizen.  On distributional grounds, net neutrality therefore operates as a 
regressive tax by compelling the materially less-advantaged to support the consumption of a 
relatively advantaged group. 
As a general rule, a norm prohibiting forced wealth transfers from the relatively disadvantaged to 
the relatively advantaged appears to have a stronger appeal on welfare grounds than the net 
neutrality norm.  The policy against regressive transfers is likely to improve social welfare, when 
distribution of wealth is taken into account, while the net neutrality norm degrades distributional 
efficiency.  If net neutrality enhanced general efficiency – that is, enhanced society’s wealth – 
then it might be desirable in spite of its negative distributional effects.  But the general efficiency 
argument for net neutrality is ambiguous, lacking empirical support currently, and unlikely to be 
proven valid even when the empirical evidence has been fully explored.  Hence, the net 
neutrality norm at present offers an unambiguous reduction in distributional efficiency coupled 
with a likely negative impact on general efficiency. 
The norm against regressive coerced transfers operates generally, while the net neutrality norm 
operates within a narrow subset of society.  This suggests an important difference between the 
two norms, with distributional implications.  The policy disfavoring regressive transfers is 
                                                 
15 http://civicscience.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/CivicScience-Netflixs-New-Users-May-2015-Final.pdf.  
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unlikely to serve effectively as a veil for concealing the aims of some faction interested in 
transferring wealth to itself, because it operates across a wide spectrum of society.  A narrow 
faction that appeals to the antiregressiveness principle purely out of self-interest – that is, to 
justify efforts to expropriate wealth from others – could easily find itself losing as a result of the 
principle just as much as it gains.  The net neutrality norm, by contrast, offers a narrowly tailored 
argument that, by seeming to invoke a lofty goal, obscures self-interested motives.  The 
beneficiaries of net neutrality form a concentrated interest group, and therefore would benefit 
from a norm that conceals an effort to persuade government to transfer wealth in its favor.  Given 
the net neutrality norm’s usefulness as an instrument that simultaneously facilitates and obscures 
expropriative activity in the political process, it should be regarded with some suspicion from a 
distributional efficiency perspective. 
4. Vertical Integration 
One reason the bridge analogy may seem incomplete as stated previously is that in some settings 
the ability to price differentially among bridge users might be used in an anticompetitive manner.  
Suppose one truck service purchases the bridge and charges high prices to rival truckers to use 
the bridge. This scenario is often described as the essential facilities problem in antitrust, where 
the classic case, United States v. Terminal Railroad,16 involved a consortium of railroads that 
purchased a bridge (actually, the rail terminal facilities connected to the bridge) that had to be 
used by competing railroads.  In the internet network setting, a vertically integrated network 
owner (integrated into content) might use differential pricing to harm competitors in the content 
market.17 
I have already established that differential pricing could encourage efficient (in a second-best 
sense) consumption of bridge services, and the same is true of general platforms such as a 
broadband network.  Differential pricing might also provide the most efficient method of 
recouping the costs of constructing a platform, such as a bridge or a broadband network.18  The 
net neutrality norm is therefore inadvisable because of its efficiency costs.  However, net 
neutrality might be defended still, because it prevents anticompetitive price discrimination 
among platform users. 
There are reasons to question this argument for net neutrality.  First, net neutrality goes further 
than necessary.  Antitrust laws already exist for regulating anticompetitive conduct, and they 
attempt to regulate with a finer brush than the net neutrality rule.  An antitrust court would take 
efficiencies into account in any analysis of a complaint against a vertically-integrated platform 
owner on antitrust grounds.  The net neutrality principle ignores efficiencies. 
Second, the market provides disincentives to predatory abuse in the vertical integration setting.  
If vertical integration yields no efficiencies, the vertically-integrated bridge owner will be 
punished, to some degree, by capital markets as investors observe the risk that the vertically 
integrated owner might reduce the market value of the bridge in order to provide an advantage to 
                                                 
16 224 U.S. 383 (1912). 
17 See, e.g., Hazlett and Wright (2012). 
18 On Ramsey pricing and broadband networks, see Yoo (2013, at 580). 
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its own content flowing over the bridge.  This may seem speculative, at first, but examples exist.  
Keurig, a maker of coffee brewing devices famously associated with the small plastic cups (K-
cups) used for making coffee, recently abandoned its effort to lock out the products of rival K-
cup makers from compatibility with its brewing device.  When Keurig attempted to switch to a 
new brewing device that made rival K-cups technologically incompatible, the firm’s stock price 
dropped so quickly that it reversed course and announced that it would continue marketing a 
device that could accommodate rival cups.  Moreover, this reversal happened despite the fact that 
Keurig had virtually no significant competition in the market for its brewing devices. 
The Keurig experience suggests that a firm that owns a facility which rivals must access to 
provide service to customers may suffer a severe penalty in the capital markets for attempting to 
exclude rival service providers.  The value of the facility is determined by the overall quality and 
variety of services that the facility can provide.  Locking out rival service providers may reduce 
the value of the facility.  Hence, predatory exclusion is not always a costless exercise, even in the 
absence of the threat of competition or antitrust penalties, and in the case of Keurig would have 
been permitted by the capital market to occur only if it were efficient. 
Broadband firms face the same capital market constraints as the makers of coffee brewing 
devices.  If content exclusion were an efficient strategy for broadband firms, capital markets 
would steer them toward it.  But remarkably few instances that potentially could be described as 
anticompetitive content exclusion have been observed.19 
Finally, direct competition with other platform providers constrains anticompetitive abuse.  
While high-speed broadband networks tend to face few competitors in most American markets,20 
the existence of geographic markets in which some consumers have access to more than one 
high-speed network suggests that the threat of competitive entry exists in the broadband market.  
Google’s fiber service exists in three cities and promises to expand to more,21 and other 
technological novelties are in the development phase.22  Moreover, the most heavily demanded 
content providers, which create the greatest congestion costs, also drive a substantial share of the 
demand for high-speed networks – an external effect which broadband providers have strong 
incentives to consider.  An anticompetitive move to disadvantage such content, merely to 
provide a short-term boost in content owned by the vertically-integrated network, would risk a 
larger loss in market share in the future as competitive substitutes develop.  The recently-
approved merger between AT&T and DirecTV is partially premised on the argument that the 
combined entity will be able to take advantage of scale economies to invest in a more expansive 
broadband network.  If those argument are at least partially true, they signal to incumbent firms 
                                                 
19 See Hazlett & Wright (2012, at 782). 
20 Most people have only one high-speed broadband provider, see http://consumerist.com/2014/12/18/govt-report-
true-high-speed-broadband-competition-in-the-u-s-remains-largely-nonexistent/. 
21 Google Fiber gigabit service is expanding, but only in three cities now, see 
http://consumerist.com/2015/10/29/shortlist-of-future-google-fiber-cities-keeps-getting-longer-three-more-cities-
added/. 




that anticompetitive abusive treatment of content providers is at best a short-term strategy with 
great long-term risks. 
Perhaps the bigger issue in the competitive landscape for broadband is the role of 
Schumpeterian, or dynamic, competition.  At any given moment, the market for high-speed 
broadband can be defined in a manner that seems to imply that most consumers are vulnerable to 
mistreatment by firms with monopoly power.  Network quality improves through substantial 
capital investments, and short-run market power provides the primary incentive for such 
investments.  At the same time, technology continually generates new types of content or 
methods of enhancing existing content, in turn creating more demand for higher quality 
broadband networks.  The recent history of the market appears to one of chicken-and-egg 
evolution with advances in networks supporting advances in content, and advances in content 
creating demand for more sophisticated networks.  
Yet, if every time a substantial investment in network quality occurs, regulatory agencies treat 
the resulting picture of high concentration, when the market is defined by selecting the highest 
quality broadband service, as evidence of a lack of competition and therefore a justification for 
price regulation, then incentives to invest will be dulled.  Indeed, the factions that demand price 
regulation will always be able to find an empirical justification given the economic relationship 
between quality, investment, and market concentration.  This generates the paradoxical result 
that as the potential for significant network quality improvements increases – resulting in more 
choices for consumers among different levels of service quality – the threat of burdensome 
regulation based on a static vision of competition increases too.   
5. Government Coercion 
Another reason the bridge analogy may seem incomplete is that it leaves out the problem of 
government coercion as a potential justification for the net neutrality norm.  The government 
coercion problem provides net neutrality proponents with perhaps their strongest argument, but it 
is far from compelling in the end. 
The threat of government coercion in the broadband service market arises in two settings; one 
potentially desirable from a social welfare perspective, and the other almost certainly 
undesirable.  The potentially desirable form of coercion arises as a response to internet piracy.  
Content owners have sued internet service providers, seeking a more active effort by the network 
providers to block pirate websites or sellers of knock-off products.23  Content owners invariably 
argue that the internet service providers have not done enough to ensure that copyrights or 
trademarks are not regularly infringed through their networks.  In the case of trademarks, the 
networks typically make available cheap knock-offs of established brands that either directly 
infringe the established trademark, or exhibit sufficient similarity to have the same effect (trade 
dress infringement). 
                                                 
23 MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005); BMG Rights Management (US) LLC et al. v. Cox 
Enterprises Inc. et al., case number 1:14-cv-01611, in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. 
10 
 
As a general matter, broadband networks should not be held strictly liable for copyright or 
trademark infringement.  The networks provide a valuable social good by enhancing the flow of 
information in society.  The positive spillover benefits provided by broadband networks probably 
outweigh the harms to copyright and trademark owners.  Still, the remaining question is whether 
the owners of broadband networks have an obligation to monitor the theft of intellectual property 
and just how much effort such an obligation would entail on their parts.  
The net neutrality norm enters here with an obvious application.  Broadband network owners 
may prefer something like a network neutrality rule as a barrier to any claims of liability for 
copyright or trademark infringement.  A broadband network could assert the neutrality norm as a 
justification for treating all content providers alike, and for reluctance to differentially treat any 
of its content providers.  A network neutrality rule enacted into law might provide a powerful 
preemption defense to any broadband network sued for facilitating infringement of intellectual 
property. 
In this setting, the net neutrality norm provides an overly broad principle that stands in the way 
of designing an optimal regulatory scheme.  To monitor and control the infringement of 
intellectual property, broadband providers may have to adopt more aggressive measures than 
have been adopted to date.  Courts applying standard negligence principles are in an ideal 
position to determine the proper balance between risk and precaution on the part of broadband 
providers.  A net neutrality regulation, asserted in an effort to preempt a court from applying 
negligence principles, would effectively remove courts from an area of regulation in which they 
have traditionally operated, and in which they may be able to provide an appropriate solution to 
conflicting interests. 
The other form of government coercion I referred to earlier, which is not socially desirable, is 
state-directed control of internet content.  The net neutrality norm arguably provides the benefit 
of enabling broadband networks to cite the norm (or regulation) as a justification for refusing to 
carry out the censorship aims of a particular government. Here, the norm appears to be 
unnecessary in a society in which the government is constrained to protect free speech, and 
wholly ineffective in a society in which the government is not so constrained.  In the United 
States, the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution should form a sufficient legal basis for any 
broadband provider to resist efforts on the part of the U.S. government to control content, 
especially of a political nature, on the internet.  It is not clear what a net neutrality norm could 
provide beyond the protection already provided by the constitutional guarantee of free speech.  If 
anything, a net neutrality norm would likely be harmful in preventing the government from 
establishing, through either judicial or regulatory standards, optimal regulations to control abuses 
such as copyright infringement. 
What if, instead of the government directing the network to constrain speech, the network itself 
attempts to constrain speech?  For example, suppose a network announces that it will impose a 
special charge on content providers who intend to transmit speech the network regards as 
offensive to some particular person or group?  The neutrality principle would arguably promote 
free expression in this special case by preventing the network firm from imposing discriminatory 
viewpoint-based charges.  However, there are several reasons to doubt the desirability of the 
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neutrality norm even in this scenario.  First, the neutrality norm goes too far by prohibiting all 
discriminatory charges rather than limiting its prohibition to viewpoint-based discriminatory 
charges.  As in the scenarios considered earlier (anticompetitive abuse, preemption), the 
neutrality rule prohibits desirable forms of discrimination in an effort to root out potentially 
undesirable forms of discrimination.  Second, competitive pressures (for customers, for capital) 
will constrain the incentives of network firms to discriminate on the basis of viewpoint.  Indeed, 
if viewpoint discrimination were attractive to consumers, the heavy-handed internet censoring 
observed in China would not be met by massive efforts to circumvent it.  Third, large broadband 
firms have valuable contracts with federal and state governments,24 and would surely put these 
contracts at risk by engaging in viewpoint-based discrimination of content providers.  These last 
two considerations suggest that the market will discourage broadband firms from engaging in 
viewpoint-based discrimination among content providers. 
In a government that is not constrained (through both law and actual enforcement) to protect free 
speech, such as that of China, a net neutrality norm would be the feeblest of barriers against 
government coercion.  The content providers themselves would face the threat of punishment if 
they were to violate the government’s censorship rules.  Broadband providers might or might not 
comply with a rule of net neutrality, but it would make no difference to the underlying problem 
of censorship by the government.  Indeed, the net neutrality norm might facilitate the 
government’s censorship by preventing broadband providers from taking any actions that might 
counteract the government’s direct control over content providers.  The net neutrality norm could 
then be paraded ostentatiously by the censoring government as a sign of its relative 
enlightenment.  
6. Conclusion 
In theory, implementing the net neutrality norm might be socially desirable, and could be 
justified on the same grounds as the fair use doctrine in copyright law.  However, in practice, the 
conditions that justify fair use in the copyright context do not appear to hold in the settings in 
which the net neutrality principle operates.  Moreover, the cross-subsidization required by net 
neutrality generates a transfer from the relatively poor to the relatively rich.  For every potential 
social gain that might be provided by the neutrality policy, an alternative, narrower policy exists 
that would be at least as effective and less likely to have harmful side effects. Efficiency and 
equity considerations provide no support for the net neutrality norm. 
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